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Mark Carter* Reconsidering the Charter and
Electoral Boundaries
This article argues for a judicial interpretation of the right to vote under s.3 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that places more emphasis upon ihe
principle of the equal power of every vote-"one person, one vote"--than maybe
suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Reference re: Electoral
Boundaries Commission Act. This becomes an issue of particular importance
when a government is suspected of engaging in gerrymandering. Gerrymandering
involves enhancing expected electoral support by ensuring that fewer votes will
be needed to elect representatives in ridingspredictedto support the government.
Any concessions governments may wish to make to the principle of the equality
of every vote should be justified in the context of Charter s. 1 or s. 15(2). These
sections represent important exceptions to the particular theory of rights that
provides the clearest rationale for many of the provisions in the Charter, including
the right to vote.
Cet article propose une interpretation judiciaire du droit de voter sous 'article 3
de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes qui met I'accent sur le principe du
pouvoir dgal de chaque vote : "une personne, un vote" plut6t que sur ce qui est
sugg6r6 par la d6cision Reference re; Electoral Boundaries Commission Act
rendue par la Cour suprdme du Canada. Cette question deveint particulierement
importante lorsqu'un gouvemement est soupponn6 de charcutage 6lectoral Le
charcutage 61ectoral comprend I'augmentation de I'appui esp~r6 en assurant
que moins de votes seront n6cessaires pour faire elire des representants dans
les circonscriptions oi) on attend le retourdu candidat gouvernemental. N'importe
quelle concession que le gouvernement aimeraitapporterau principe du pouvoir
egal de chaque vote devrait dtre justifi6e dans le contexte des articles 1 et 15 (2)
de la Charte. Ces articles representent d'importantes exceptions a la theorie
particuliere des droits qui offre le raisonnement le plus lucide pour plusieurs
dispositions de la Charte, y inclus le droit de voter.
* School of Criminology, Simon Fraser Univesity.
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Introduction
1812 was a bad year for salamanders. That is when the good name of this
lizard-like amphibian became forever linked to that of Massachusetts'
Republican Governor Elbridge Gerry and the practice of manipulating
electoral boundaries for partisan political purposes. It was Governor
Gerry's achievement not only to sign into law new state senatorial
districts that favoured Republican candidates over Federalists,' but also
to approve of one district that was shaped roughly like a salamander. In
1. The Republicans and the Federalists were the two "classical parties of the early
republic"(Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. infra at xxxiv) that emerged, declined, and were replaced
by other parties, notwithstanding initial hopes that a party system would not characterize
Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries
response to this observation, a wag commented that it was better to call
it a "Gerrymander."2 Thus was born the image of a"grinning mythological
monster" manifesting a spirit of base political motivation, and a new verb.
Gerrymandering refers to the practice of "reshaping ... a district by the
political party in power so as to make its votes count as much as possible
and those of the opposition as little as possible."3
Governor Gerry's kind of electoral boundary manipulation seems to
strike against the important principle that the activities of elected
representatives in a democracy should be motivated primarily by a
concern for the public good rather than the maintenance of their own
power.4 That being said, this original example of gerrymandering does
not necessarily offend another democratic principle which is arguably
more important and certainly easier to articulate. This is the principle of
the equality of every citizen in a democracy. The most symbolically and
practically significant manifestation of this essential tenet of democratic
thought and practice is the equal power of every citizen's vote.5 The
concept of gerrymandering has developed to embrace political activity
that offends this principle of voting parity. This paper focuses upon
situations that generate concern over this kind of gerrymandering, and
explores the philosophical basis for objections to the practice.
American politics. Among other general characteristics, Republicans favoured a very limited
role for government in the economy, and the Federalists envisioned some relative activism in
this regard. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., History of U.S. Political Parties: Volume I,
1789-1860, From Factions to Parties, (New York: Chelsea House, 1973).
2. G.A. Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1976) at 316. This anecdote is included primarily so as to allow me to share this
interesting point of history, but also to allow me to make amends to salamanders. Like a lot of
people, I knew that the word gerrymandering had something to do with this animal. Unfairly
on my part, however, I assumed that the allusion was to the physical sliminess of the maligned
creature. Such sliminess seems to connote the kind of political corruption that the practice of
gerrymandering manifests. As indicated above, I now realize that salamanders' shape alone is
responsible for their association with this kind of conduct. Having said that, a (very) little
research revealed that some species of newts-small salamanders-produce toxic secretions.
Accordingly, the salamander-politics parallel may be fortuitous after all. Furthermore, the
amazing ability of some salamanders to regenerate body parts-return from the near dead as
it were-seems metaphorically rich indeed!
3. Ibid.
4. The Governor's response to this would likely have been that the interests of the Republican
Party and the public are indistinguishable.
5. Indeed, the most "bizarrely shaped" electoral districts (as the U.S. Supreme Court would
have it: Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993) will probably be a product of attempts to respect
this principle of voting parity, while at the same time trying to bring together geographically
isolated pockets of support for a particular party or candidate. See J.H. Ely, "Gerrymanders:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly" (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 607 at 608 [hereinafter
"Gerrymanders"].
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The American experience, again, is instructive. In the 1960s, the
United States Supreme Court held that electoral boundaries that establish
districts with significantly different numbers of voters infringe the
American Constitution's equal protection clause, the fourteenth
amendment.6 The leading cases dealt with governments' failure to redraw
the boundaries of electoral districts in response to the dramatic migration
of voters from rural districts to urban centres in the first half of the
century.7 This government inactivity resulted in rural voters having
relatively more electoral power than urban voters. It is not surprising that
the conservative administrations in question drew most of their support
from the dwindling rural electorate. This willful inactivity created what
one American commentator calls a "stranglehold [on government power]
that reactionary rural elites enjoyed."8
The Supreme Court of the United States responded by articulating the
constitutional standard of one person, one vote. This standard is held to
ensure that "in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government,
a majority of the people . . . could elect a majority of [the] . . .
legislators."9 This point seems so axiomatic in its relationship to basic
democratic practice that its announcement has become something of the
paragon example of the legitimate exercise of the otherwise controversial
power of judicial review.' 0
Governing parties' self-serving failure to redraw electoral boundaries
has been called "silent gerrymandering."" By contrast, the facts that gave
6. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America reads in part:
Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws...
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) [hereinafter Baker]; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) [hereinafter Reynolds].
8. P.S. Karlan, "The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census" (1998) 50
Stan. L. Rev. 731 at 735 [hereinafter Karlan].
9. Reynolds, supra note 7 at 565. Quoted in Karlan, ibid. at 735.
10. Thus John Hart Ely speaks of the Supreme Court being in search of "its 'one person, one
vote' principle to settle the issue as to the constitutionality of what has been called "racial
gerrymandering." "Gerrymanders", supra note 5 at 609-10. Racial gerrymandering involves
the laudable attempt to structure electoral boundaries in such a way as to ensure the
representation of racial and ethnic minorities and groups in government. Ely's point is that the
Court would like to identify for this area of election law a standard that is as intuitively "right,"
and therefore, as generally accepted, as the one person, one vote standard.
11. B. Grofman, "What Happens After One Person-One Vote? Implications of the United
States Experience for Canada" in J. Courtney, P. MacKinnon, & D.E. Smith eds., Drawing
Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992) 156
[hereinafter Grofman].
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rise to the leading Canadian case on the extent to which voting equality
is mandated by the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (hereinafter
the Charter)2 were very noisy. Reference re: Electoral Boundaries
Commission Act or, Carter v. Saskatchewan3 involved what some
observers saw as an extraordinarily bold example of partisan legislative
manoeuvring on the part of the Progressive Conservative administration
of Premier Grant Devine in the late 1980s. The concern of some members
of the public was that this activity seemed to be aimed at ensuring that
votes in rural ridings, where the Conservatives drew most of their support,
were generally weighted more heavily than those in urban ridings.'4
12. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
13. Reference Re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. Decision of
Justice McLachlin for the majority (La Forest, Gonthier, Stevenson and lacobucci JJ.). Justice
Cory delivered a dissenting decision with Lamer C.J.C. and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurring
[hereinafter Carter].
14. For example, writing in the immediate wake of the Devine administration's changes to
the electoral boundaries legislation that will be discussed more fully below, James Pitsula and
Kenneth Rasmussen wrote [Privatizing a Province: The New Right in Saskatchewan (Vancouver:
New Star Books, 1990), at 254-255]:
A respect for representative democracy was conspicuously absent from the Tories'
redrawing of electoral boundaries. After Premier Ross Thatcher's outrageous
gerrymander of 1971, the Blakeney government... established [a reformed and more
independent] Electoral Boundaries Commission .... The legislation called for
constituencies with an average of 10,000 voters, and permitted only a 15 percent
variance from that number. It also provided for an automatic review of constituency
boundaries every eight years.
When the eight-year period elapsed, Devine refused to allow the already-existing
Electoral Boundaries Commission to do its work. Instead, he brought in a new
law ... [replacing t]he clerk of the legislature, a non-partisan officer, [with] the chief
electoral officer, a political appointee. Even more significant, the Tories changed the
rules to permit the number of voters in a constituency to vary by as much as 25 per cent
from the average. This paved the way for a gerrymander whereby rural seats, where the
Tories are traditionally strongest had fewer voters than did urban seats. Twenty-one of
the 26 NDP seats had their boundaries redrawn... while only ten of the 38 seats held
by the government saw their boundaries change.
Similarly, Merrilee Rasmussen and Howard Leeson comment upon the "suspicious nature" of
the (then) new electoral boundaries regime in Saskatchewan. In "Parliamentary Democracy in
Saskatchewan, 1982-1989" [Lesley Hope and Mark Stobbe, eds., Devine Rule in Saskatchewan:
A Decade of Hope and Hardship (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991)] the authors write (at 64):
Thus, even before the commission begins its work, the outcome of a general election
is stacked in favour of the party which is primarily based in rural Saskatchewan and the
value of a vote in the cities of Saskatchewan is worth less than the value of a vote in the
country. The principle of "one person, one vote" is a fundamental underpinning of
representative democracies and equality of the vote is a corollary notion. Interfering
with the commission's ability to draw boundaries which attempt to adhere as closely as
possible to this principle interferes with a basic democratic right.
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Notwithstanding such concerns about the use of government power to
pursue partisan goals, the majority in the Carter decision held that the
constitution was not necessarily offended by a scheme of weighted voting
that seemed destined to serve such ends. According to the Court, the right
to vote under s. 3 of the Charter15 does not enshrine equality of voting
power per se. While "relative parity of voting power" is of "prime
importance," the majority held that s. 3 captures the broader concept of
"effective representation."' 16 The Court elaborated that this principle is
informed by an open-ended list of factors. In addition to equal voting
power, these factors include geography, community history, community
interests, and minority or group representation. 7
Effective representation is a problematic concept. Its vagueness invites
extensive judicial interpretation and it promises little assistance to
citizens who are concerned that the right to vote should provide some
protection against cynical political activity. The manipulation of electoral
boundaries for partisan purposes is a concern in any democratic context.
However, the Carter decision seems to support the view that a party in
power will apparently be given the benefit of the doubt as to its motivation.
Following the Court's logic, any advantage that an administration may
receive from the unequal voting districts that it establishes is presumptively
incidental to its concern for higher ideals. Such ideals do not, however,
have to be established according to any clear standard of proof, civil or
otherwise. While the Court refers to "evidence" in its decision, it does not
elaborate on its use in a principled manner. Therefore, while the Carter
decision does not sanction partisan political gerrymandering, it gives it a
lot of room in which to hide.
The creation of unequal voting districts to bolster a weak basis of
political support is a form of bad faith and an abuse of power. As such,
it is an archetypal example of activity that bills of rights like the Charter
were invented to address: abuses of government power that threaten the
equality-among other liberal values-of individuals in a society.
Accordingly, to some extent the very mettle of the Charter is tested in
relation to its success in assisting the citizenry in dealing with this issue.
A stronger bulwark against this kind of activity is needed than the
Supreme Court provided in Carter. In fact, although it was a theme of at
least one of the interveners' submissions to the Court 8 the decision is
15. Section 3 of the Charter reads: "Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election
of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for
membership therein." Supra note 12.
16. Carter, supra note 13 at 183.
17. Ibid. at 184.
18. Professor John F. Conway, of the University of Regina.
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silent as to the gerrymandering issue and to the need for a Charter
jurisprudence that is capable of addressing it. Accordingly, if 1812 was
a bad year for salamanders, then 199 1-the year that the Carter decision
was handed down-was a good year for gerrymandering in Canada.
Notwithstanding this critique, the potential remains post-Carter for
the Charter to be interpreted to strengthen recognition of the principle of
voting parity. A clear constitutional mandate for the relative equality of
every citizen's vote is the best safeguard against gerrymandering being
misrepresented or justified as concern for the greater good of particular
electoral constituencies. Like many aspects of life, law is not so much a
search for perfect solutions as it is a choice among imperfect alternatives.
For a number of reasons, it will be argued that a clearer constitutional
mandate for the principle of voting parity is "less imperfect" than the
kinds of concessions that the Carter decision would seem to allow. As
important as factors like geography, community history, community
interests, and minority or group representation may be, they would be
better understood as potential concessions to the Charter protected right
to vote, rather than characteristics of the right itself. As concessions,
Charter s. 1 analysis is designed to allow us to debate their reasonableness.19
This article will use voting rights as a focus for an introductory
discussion of issues relating to critical legal theory and rights. I am
interested in addressing what I see as a tension in this body of thought as
it relates to rights talk.2" I characterize this tension as a "critics' dilemma."
This part of the paper argues that there are times when progressive
legalists cannot afford to ignore rights-based legal strategies and Charter
litigation. Furthermore, voting rights' unique impact upon majoritarian
institutions of government should make the interpretation of these rights
a matter of particular concern for critical legalists and, specifically, those
critical legal theorists who identify themselves as critics of rights.
Next I develop a theme of criticism to be applied to the Supreme
Court's decision in Carter. I argue in this section that the democratic
nature of judicial Charter review would be enhanced by the judiciary's
clearer embrace of a more consistent vision of rights theory. With some
misgivings I recommend as the best candidate for that theory, the current
of rationalist liberal individualism that generated bills of rights initially.
In Carter, the Supreme Court engaged in a method of rights analysis that
19. Section 1 of the Charter reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Supra note 12.
20. I adopt this term from M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984), 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363.
For the purposes of this discussion, rights talk implies the use of rights as tools of analysis or
to assist in realizing political objectives through litigation.
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is inductive and empirical in nature, and which is characteristic of the
British legal tradition. This analytical approach, when undertaken in the
context of the application of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights,
increases the undemocratic potential of judicial review.
The last part of this discussion returns to gerrymandering. If Canadians
are willing to acquiesce in a considerable degree of voting inequality,
then it is argued that they at least deserve a constitutional jurisprudence
that more clearly restricts the potential for the partisan political
manoeuvring that may underlie the creation of unequal electoral districts.
It will be argued that the Carter decision's relative silence with respect
to this issue leaves room for future judicial decisions to develop our
understanding of Charter s. 3 in a manner that is consistent with this
project of silencing noisy gerrymandering in Canada.
I. The Critics' Dilemma
A central current of critical legal thought argues that engaging in rights
talk necessarily involves some degree of acceptance of, or acquiescence
in, what may be called "dominant rights theory ideology."'" This
ideological perspective is instrumental in presenting as natural and,
therefore, beyond criticism, the economic social stratification that is a
necessary condition of capitalism. The most important aspect of the
critique of rights for present purposes is that which argues that engaging
in rights litigation, or demanding the legal recognition of rights, amounts
to consorting with the enemy. This is presented as, alternatively, dangerous,
degrading, and futile. To generalize rather crudely about a sophisticated
argument, a legal system in a capitalist society will only generate
decisions that enhance judicial power and maintain unequal economic
and social relations. These unequal relations are what compel socially
and economically dispossessed people to frame their demands in terms of
rights in the first place.
21. Joel Bakan and Michael Smith define dominant rights theory ideology as follows: "the
set of rights discourses that constitutes the prevailing and generally unquestioned 'common
sense' about what rights are; helps sustain the dominant order of social relations by allowing
that order to be presented as natural and legitimate, masking social facts that reveal its nastier
sides and universalizing the interests of dominant groups; and that embodies elements
sufficiently attractive and plausible to command popular support." J. Bakan & M. Smith,
"Rights, Nationalism, and Social Movements in Canadian Constitutional Politics" in
D. Schneiderman & K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter
Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 218 at 240,
n. 14 [hereinafter Bakan and Smith].
22. For a succinct example, see J. Fudge & H. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics
with Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & L. Studies 45.
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People who are interested in law's potential to operate as a vehicle for
achieving progressive social and political objectives have been and
continue to be warned against falling into the rights trap.23 This is an
understandable and, I think, desirable state of affairs. While the critique
of rights may have lost some of its radical impact, the Charter-inspired
"rights revolution" continues apace. Therefore, someone needs to keep
sounding a note of caution-alarm even-in relation to the retrogressive
potential of rights talk.
If, then, this is not the time to abandon the critical legal contribution to
the debate about the value of .rights talk, many progressive legalists
believe that it is time reconsider the extent to which that contribution
mandates the wholesale abandonment of rights. 4 Although the recent
work of some prominent rights critics continues to raise serious and
disturbing questions about the politics of rights in Canada and the United
States,25 it is not clear that people who share their concern for a more
equitable society can afford to stay out of the rights interpretation
debate.2 6 Of particular concern is the fact that, regardless of what may be
the limited ability of rights talk to advance substantive equality, 7 rights
litigation can clearly undermine that kind of equality in certain important
respects.2 8 Therefore, it would seem important to maintain a presence in
23. See for example D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de sicle (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1997) [hereinafter A Critique of Adjudication]; M. Mandel, The
Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thompson,
1994) [hereinafter Mandel]; A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf" A Critique of Law and
Politics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) [hereinafter Hutchinson].
24. See for example A. Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies"
(1990) 17 J. L. & Society 309; W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989); G. Binion, "Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective" (1995), 17 Hum.
Rts. Q. 509; M. Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover" (1987) 96 Yale L.J.
1860.
25. Supra note 23.
26. See M. Carter, Book Review of Waitingfor Coraf' A Critique of Laws and Rights by A.C.
Hutchinson (1996) 11 Can. J. L. & Society 292; M. Carter, Book Review of A Critique of
Adjudication:fin de siicle by D. Kennedy (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 399.
27. Substantive equality essentially refers to equality of actual living conditions. It is
distinguished from formal equality-linked to the notion of juridical equality-which is
captured by the notion of "same treatment." These different standards of equality present an
important tension in human rights thought. Ensuring substantive equality often requires
treating people differently, which offends formal equality. To the extent that respect for the
dignity of every individual is central to the human rights project, the question arises as to which
kind of equality is most essential to human dignity in a situation when the two standards seem
to conflict.
28. See M. Carter, "Criminal Law, Women's Equality, the Charter: An Analysis of the
Criminal Code's Self-Induced Intoxication Provisions" in M. Jackson & K.S. Banks, eds., Ten
Years Later: The Charter and Equalityfor Women (Vancouver: Canada Publishing, 1996) 122.
In this paper I discuss why the Charter "victories" seem so regularly to compromise the
equality and security interests of women.
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such litigation whenever that is possible. If that makes sense then, like it
or not, rights talk is the linguafranca of the courts.
Quite apart from being forced to join the rights fray in order to defend
substantive equality from libertarian attack, going on the offensive often
recommends itself as a strategy. Struggles for formal equality 29-for the
removal of arbitrary barriers to full participation in society based upon
such factors as gender or ethnic identity-have almost defined the "good
fight" from a socially progressive point of view in this century.30 In
keeping with the concerns of this article, voting rights are a good example
of this. Women, First Nations people, and people of non-Western
European background struggled for the franchise well into this century.3
This is where the critics' dilemma becomes most acute. Is it hypocritical
or unacceptably cynical for one to invoke rights for strategic political
purposes if one accepts the critique of rights?32 As suggested, a theme of
the critique holds that the legal system operates so as to maintain unequal
and oppressive social relations. People serve the ends of this system by
showing faith in Charter rights and freedoms and the legal process
through which their enforcement is pursued. In fact, the argument
continues, the Charter offers only false hope of achieving anything more
than token gains in equality. Therefore, the question arises as to whether
the token gains that may be achieved are ever worth the price of
hypocrisy. From the rights-critical perspective that is being briefly
sketched here, political victories are always tainted if courts deliver them.
In the context of a Charter challenge, this involves the patronizing
spectacle of trying to convince judges to second-guess our representative
institutions of government.33 Although these representative institutions
29. Supra note 27.
30. W. Tarnopolsky, "Discrimination and the Law in Canada" (1992) 41 U.N.B.L.J. 215
[hereinafter "Discrimination"].
31. "Discrimination", ibid. provides an overview of Canada's history of exclusionary voting
practices. This is one reason why the Carter decision's deference to Canada's traditions in this
regard is most disconcerting.
32. In fact ambivalence abounds in this regard. For example, in A Critique ofAdjudication,
supra, note 23, Duncan Kennedy chastizes those who invoke rights discourse to formulate
political demands, for taking advantage of true rights believers (at 310-311). Later, however,
he indicates his favour for invoking rights talk for strategic purposes "as long as the deployer
has in mind the element of bad faith in his or her performance" (at 358). Similarly, if less
dramatically, Alan Hutchinson's sustained critique of rights talk contains such concessions as:
"[T]he liberal campaign for free speech ought not to be undervalued; its solicitude for the
interests of individual speakers against unwarranted state interference is of great significance."
Hutchinson, supra, note 23 at 204.
33. At the end of his preface to The Charter and the Legalization of Politics Michael Mandel
writes: "Then there is the authoritarian nature of the courts, which makes the whole thing not
only dishonest but also demeaning. Pleading is not a democratic form of discourse. It dates
from a time when democracy was a dirty word." Mandel, supra note 23 at xii.
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are far from perfect, the critical argument sees them as vehicles for policy
creation that are more democratic, in an important sense, than judicial
decisions.34 The truest victories, then, are won "in the streets" by political
activism and by the reasoned persuasion of the public and elected
representatives.
The particular focus of this discussion-voting rights-provide a
limited route beyond this dilemma. If the price of some rights struggles
is too high, then voting rights must always be a special case. As ifd-icated
above, an important theme of the critical response to the rights revolution
is that, as imperfect as our representative institutions of government may
be, they are a better place for dealing with political issues than the courts
are. Inasmuch as constitutionally entrenched rights in general operate to
undermine Canadian democracy, voting rights can be interpreted in such
a way as to undermine the representative nature of the very institutions
that continue to be the least imperfect alternative to Charter-inspired
judicial policy making. Therefore, if it is important to maintain the
integrity of representative institutions as alternatives to the legalization
of politics that the Charter encourages then, ironically, it is important to
maintain the integrity of voting rights as enshrined in the Charter.
But the irony for rights critics does not end with the fact that they have
a special interest in the interpretation of voting rights. The next part of this
discussion will suggest that rights critics should be interested in having
the courts pay closer attention to a particular body of theory when they
interpret many of the Charter's provisions. That theory is a variant of
34. At issue in all of this is the complex question as to the nature of democracy. The
majoritarianism that is associated with broadly representative institutions can be at odds with
the pursuit of standards of substantive equality to the extent that the majority, through its
representatives, may not be persuaded to adopt policies aimed at realizing these goals. This is
the case notwithstanding the fact that both of these concepts inform important notions of
democracy. For his part, Michael Mandel argues the legalization of politics brought on by the
Charter has compromised both the principle of majoritarianism and the pursuit of the goal of
substantive equality. In Chapter 1 of his book, Mandel argues that dissatisfaction with
Canada's representative institutions of government made the Canadian public susceptible to
assurances that the Charter would enhance democracy in this country. He argues, however, that
this was wrong and that our political system was at least "more" democratic, in a majoritarian
sense, before the Charter. Mandel, supra note 23. Entrenched bills of rights historically emerge
to ensure that the interests of political and economic elites are not threatened by demands for
redistribution of opportunity and capital. In the American context, a constructive aspect of
Kennedy's A Critique ofAdjudication that also evinces a pragmatic preference for majoritarian
institutions is his proposal for "counterfactual legislative supremacy." According to this
proposal "in every case where appellate judges at the highest level decided a question of law,
there [would be] an appeal to the legislature, with a strong practice of the legislature
considering and deciding the question [.J" Supra note 23 at 215. Accordingly, this suggests
some degree of satisfaction with existing representative institutions.
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liberal individualism, the bete noire of the contemporary critical legal
perspective.35 "Better the devil you know ......
II. The Search for Rational Limits to Charter Interpretation
1. Taking Rights Reluctantly
This paper is written from a position of sympathy with many aspects of
the critical legal perspective briefly described above, including the
critique of rights. The concern is well founded that the Charter may
represent a liberal individualist threat to areas of the law where the pursuit
of social justice and substantive equality are better served by political
sensibilities that are more collectivist in nature. However, as suggested in
the footnotes and accompanying text of the preceding section, pessimism
about the progressive potential of rights talk is not shared by all leftist
legal scholars. It may be the case that the indeterminacy of rights talk can
be exploited in such a way as to assist in exposing the contingent nature
of the hierarchical and oppressive social relations that, heretofore, it has
served to conceal.36
A related interpretative project would involve giving Charter
protections meanings that reflect uniquely Canadian values. These values
include, for example, a public willingness to accept government initiatives
that would be characterized as more communitarian in nature than
individualistic. Universal medicare is the great domestic example of such
a program. Charter provisions that reflect these communitarian values
would often be inconsistent with the way that identical or similarly
worded provisions have been interpreted in more individualistic or
libertarian political contexts, and in the American context in particular.
I want to develop a position that is distinguishable from the leftist
pessimism and optimism about rights talk, at least insofar as it relates to
the potential of the Charter in particular, but which I hope is reconcilable
with important aspects of both perspectives.37 This position emphasizes
the strangeness of the kind of constitutional instrument that the Charter
represents, as it presumes to frame moral absolutes and demands the
judiciary to interpret them, compare regular government activity to those
interpretations, and-possibly-to strike down such activity when it
offends those interpretations. Whatever may be said about the progressive
35. For example, see Hutchinson, supra note 23, Chapter 1, "Liberalism and the Charter."
36. See supra note 24.
37. Having said that, I am sure that this position will be unsatisfactory to strong advocates on
either side of this leftist debate.
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potential of rights talk as a general matter, or its inherent dangers,
constitutionally entrenched bills of rights like the Canadian Charter
represent a special case.
The Critical Legal concern about the heightened ideological content of
judicial review under a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights needs to
be taken seriously. Accordingly, since the Charter is not going to
disappear, the alternative for those who are concerned about judicial
review is to identify and advocate recognition of Leo-etical perspectives
and legal arguments that may represent compelling constraints upon this
kind ofjudicial activity.38 As will be suggested, the best candidate for this
perspective is one that draws upon Lockean social contract theory. The
liabilities that attend this perspective include the threat that it represents
to attempts by governments to pursue policies that are consistent with
more collectivist or communitarian social principles. These liabilities can
be minimized by greater recognition of precisely how much a product of
historical and political contingency this perspective and its artifacts-
bills of classical civil libertarian rights-actually are.
This contingent nature exists notwithstanding the way that we are
compelled to assume the character of natural law/ natural rights "believers"
as a necessary condition of engagement with this body of theory. Like any
other social or political perspective, Lockean liberal individualism offers
a rhetorical pose that may be invoked strategically to support specific
political goals.39 Concomitantly, a sophisticated recognition of the
rhetorical nature of this theory will allow us to consider as important but
unremarkable, the extent to which Charter provisions that reflect this
theory may be limited or over-ridden by the legislative branch of
government.
38. See D. Kennedy, "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology"
(1986) 36 J. Legal Educ. 518.
39. See J. Frug, "Argument as Character" (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 869. Henry Staten's
assessment of the deconstructive project is consistent with this theme. In H. Staten, Wittgenstein
and Derrida (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), Staten writes (at 19): "The value
and necessity of pure concepts and categories are not denied, but they are no longer the last
word." Staten continues (at 24): "The question that arises is, then, What does one do once one
has given up the idealizing project of knowledge, the effort to unify ever more particulars under
ever more powerful subsumptive formulas? Part of the answer is that we cannot give up-at
least, not entirely-the project of idealization." It is my argument that the Charter compels us
to maintain the attitude of idealists in relation to arguments about how its provisions should be
interpreted. In arguing that we should feel comfortable engaging in rights talk for strategic
purposes and/or because it provides the dominant terms of legal debate, and allows participation
in that debate, I am taking issue with Duncan Kennedy's argument that this amounts to taking
advantage of "true believers". See supra note 32.
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It may be possible to separate rights talk from rights theory ideology
and to use it to pursue substantive equality and to protect Canadian values.
It is not clear, however, that the Charter, in many of its provisions at least,
is an appropriate vehicle for this project. The stakes involved in the
constitutionalization of Charterstandards are too high. It is unreasonable,
for example, and perhaps silly and patronizing as well, to assume that the
judiciary can tap into a generally progressive or uniquely Canadian vision
of political morality that is shared in some way by the population at large.
The Carter decision itself demonstrates the disconcerting potential for
the meaning of Charter provisions to be tied to some of the most
unfortunate episodes in Canada's legal history.
2. Uniquely Canadian Charter Rights
Entrenched bills of rights make little sense if the meaning of their
provisions is tied in some necessary way to the legal status quo. They
serve a purpose only as standards or principles that stand apart from and
in a superior relationship to regular positive law and government activity.
Furthermore, it is impossible to separate many of the guarantees in the
Charter from principles that assert the fairly radical sovereignty of
individuals in the social world and which presume a fairly sharp distinction
between the interests of individuals and those of the state. As Joel Bakan
and Michael Smith suggest:
[R]ights discourse is not some free-floating set of signifiers: it is connected
at the root to historical and social forces and the existing social structures
and institutions they have produced. Though rights discourse may not be
conceptually fixed, it is historically and geographically anchored.4"
Some scholars have argued that, notwithstanding the classical civil
libertarian tenor of many of our Charter's provisions, the judiciary
should be encouraged to give these signifiers content that is uniquely
Canadian. The result would be a Charter that is a template for our own
non-liberal vision of political morality. In this enterprise, the work of
historian Gad Horowitz has been an inspiration.41 Horowitz sought to
understand why socialism in Canada has been strong enough to play a role
in national politics, whereas it has never been as serious a political force,
in relative terms, in the United States. Horowitz contended that the
difference is largely accounted forby the "Tory touch" that is characteristic
40. Bakan & Smith, supra note 21 at 236.
41. G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation"
(1966) 32 Can. J. Ec. & Pol. Sci. 143.
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of the Canadian political conscience. Horowitz argued that Canada
evinced this sympathy for an holistic conservative political perspective
as an incident of this country's close relationship with Britain and as a
result of its receipt of United Empire Loyalist refugees from the American
Revolution. Horowitz wrote:
In this new setting, where there is no pre-established over-powering
liberalism to force them into insignificance, they play a large part in
shaping a new political culture, significantly different from the American....
[In Canada] the sway of liberalism has proved to be not total, but
considerably mitigated by a Tory presence initially and a socialist presence
subsequently. 42
According to Horowitz, the Tory touch in the English-Canadian
tradition has been responsible for the greater presence in this country of
an understanding of society as a community rather than an aggregation of
individuals. Toryism accepts a stratified organic social vision-a
community of classes-whereas socialism envisions a classless
community. These are not consistent visions. Nonetheless, Horowitz
argued that Toryism's class-centred view operated as a precondition for
the acceptance of socialism in Canada. This precondition was missing in
the United States, where liberal individualism dominated. The demand
for a classless society "cannot be made by people who can hardly see class
and community: the individual fills their eyes. '43
One might be suspicious of Horowitz's thesis for the kind of gloss that
it offers on Canada's Tory heritage." An implication of the argument is
that there is a uniquely Central Canadian basis for Canada's socialist
tradition whereas this tradition is most clearly and strongly rooted in the
Western Canadian experience. 45 Furthermore, the Tory touch concept
places in a very awkward progressive light the legacy of the United
Empire Loyalists, whose class consciousness, anti-republicanism, and
slave-owning practices are more easily characterized as reactionary. 46
Notwithstanding this, Patrick Monahan relies upon Horowitz's Tory
touch thesis to support an argument against the adoption into Canadian
42. G. Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968)
at 12-13.
43. Ibid. at 6.
44. Well I'm suspicious, anyway.
45. See H. Gutkin & M. Gutkin, Profiles in Dissent: The Shaping of Radical Thought in the
Canadian West (Edmonton: NeWest, 1997); George Melnyk, ed., Riel to Reform: A History
of Protest in Western Canada, (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992).
46. For a balanced consideration of Loyalist ideology that identifies within it some progressive
tendencies, see Janice Potter, The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York and
Massachusetts (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983).
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law of American-style libertarian constitutional standards. Drawing
upon Horowitz's "discovery" of this essential dimension of Canada's
political identity, Monahan writes:
Although Canada is broadly liberal, there are important features of the
Canadian political tradition which cannot be placed within a purely
individualist framework .... The presence of. . . socialist ideas is an
indication of the ideological diversity of the Canadian political tradition,
particularly the legitimacy accorded collectivist or organic conceptions of
society. 47
Accordingly, Monahan goes on to argue:
To rely, in some wholesale and uncritical fashion, on the answers that
American courts and commentators have given to problems of individual
rights would be to deny the distinctiveness of the Canadian tradition ....
Thus the whole premise and justification of constitutional adjudication
under the Charter is that it gives expression to fundamental Canadian
values as opposed to fundamental American, British or European ones. 48
Monahan, therefore, characterizes a liberal individualist strategy of
rights interpretation as one that is distinctively "American." It is certainly
fair to say that such individualism is an important theme of America' s Bill
ofRightsjurisprudence. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which
this strategy can be or should be avoided by a judiciary that is faced with
the particular kind of statutory instruments that the American Bill of
Rights and Canadian Charter represent.
The intellectual context for Horowitz's discovery of the Tory touch
and, therefore, Monahan's evidence for the basis of a uniquely Canadian
complement of fundamental rights, is significant for this discussion.
Horowitz's work expressly challenges Kenneth McRae's application to
the Canadian context of Louis Hartz's "fragmentation thesis." In The
Founding of New Societies,4 9 Hartz argued that "when a part of a
European nation is detached from the whole of it, and hurled outward onto
new soil, it loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides. It
lapses into a kind of immobility."50 Hartz contended that these new
societies become islands of the parent culture's ideology as of the time of
separation. In this way Hartz emphasized the "Lockean liberalism" of
American political culture, central to which are notions of the natural
rights of each individual.
47. P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 92.
48. Ibid. at 95.
49. L. Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1964).
50. Ibid. at 1.
Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries
McRae' s adaptation of Hartz's thesis posits a figure that competes for
comic potential with Horowitz's tory-touching proto-Canadians. This
figure is "the" American liberal. McRae described this figure as follows:
To be sure, he is not quite on his home ground, and this accounts for our
initial difficulties in recognition [you can say that again]. He appears first
as an exile, a political refugee from his own land, a fragment torn once
again from the original American fragment. He settles in a land where his
religious feelings are once again hypersensitized by an attempt, ultimately
unsuccessful, at church establishment, and by the presence of a large
Catholic majority. He lives through a period of government by . . .
aristocracies. Yet through all this he retains, no matter how far obscured
or submerged, much of the original liberal heritage of the American
colonies."
It will come as no surprise that this startlingly simplistic-not to
mention arbitrary and ethnocentric-method of historical analysis does
not enjoy much serious application today. However, significance continues
to be found in relation to Hartz's observation concerning the extent to
which basic institutions of liberal government are taken for granted in
England, America and, by extension, Canada. In comparing the Anglo-
North American embrace of liberalism with the strong Continental
traditions that run in opposition to it, Mark Lilla observes:
For those of us living in these liberal nations their histories [do not look]
harmonious: we think.., of our radical dissenters and our conservatives.
Nonetheless, it is certainly true that even our most radical and conservative
thinkers have seldom strayed far from ... principles of liberal politics:
limited government, the rule of law, multiparty elections, an independent
judiciary and civil service, civilian control of the military, individual rights
to free association and worship, private property, and so forth.5"
Lilla' s comments are part of his introduction to a collection of essays
by a number of young French scholars whose work reflects important
themes in contemporary political thought in that country. This scholarship
supports the suggestion being made here that, to a significant extent,
reference to liberal individualist standards and liberal social contract
theory more particularly, is a necessary condition of rights talk and civil
libertarian bill of rights talk in particular. Thus, Stephane Rials concludes
that the increased clarity of the conversation in relation to fundamental
rights in France today is connected to a "return to Locke" and the idea-
51. K.D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" in L. Hartz, ed., The Founding of New
Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964) 219 at 234.
52. M. Lilla, "The Legitimacy of the Liberal Age" in M. Lilla, ed., New French Thought:
Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) at 3-4 [hereinafter New
French Thought].
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however outdated it may be53 -that there exist natural rights that stand
apart from positive law and its apparatuses. 4 Similarly Blandine Kriegel
asserts that "[i]t is essential for those who believe in human rights that
they be rooted in the idea of natural law. We must, quite simply, return
to natural law and further enlarge the clearing it has already carved out for
itself in the texts of our tradition. 55
The next part of this discussion develops points that have been
introduced here. These points include the idea that although there may be
a range of techniques for rights analysis and, accordingly, a number of
alternative definitions for the substance of any given right, the Charter
pushes us across a threshold. The comprehensibility of the project of
judicial review under the Charter demands that many of its provisions be
interpreted with reference to the liberal social contract tradition.
Concomitantly, the comprehensibility and, therefore, greater predictability
of judicial review promises to minimize the threat that this project
represents for democratic practice.
The strategy or theme of interpretation of the Charter that is being
suggested here can be distinguished from some form of originalism or
interpretivism. These strategies of interpretation hold that the meaning of
the Constitution should be tied to some "original understanding" of its
meaning.16 As compared to this, I am suggesting that the Charter's
meaning should be closely related to the necessary conditions or rhetorical
attitudes for rights analysis and conversation that are most comprehensible
and predictable. It may well be the case that the drafters of the Charterdid
not have these conditions in mind. Furthermore, the Carter decision itself
demonstrates that a rejection of this approach will not save us from
originalism. In rejecting the argument that the principle of one person one
vote should characterize Charters. 3, Justice McLachlin relies upon a sad
historical fact. McLachlin J. states: "[Tihere is little in the history or
philosophy of Canadian democracy that suggests that the framers of the
Charter in enacting s. 3 had as their ultimate goal the attainment of voter
parity. 5
7
53. My caveat, not Rials'.
54. S. Rials, "Rights and Modern Law" in New French Thought, supra note 52 at 172.
55. B. Kriegel, "Rights and Natural Law" in New French Thought, ibid. at 162.
56. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 621
[hereinafter Hogg].
57. Carter, supra note 13 at 185. In his accompanying decision, Justice Sopinka makes the
same point (at 197).
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3. Bills of Rights as Artifacts of Liberal Social Contract Theory
In her decision for the majority in Carter, McLachlin J. states: "What
must be sought is the broader philosophy underlying the historical
development of the right to vote - a philosophy which is capable of
explaining the past and animating the future."58 With respect, herLadyship
is clearly right about the need for a philosophical guide. The theme of the
following critique of the decision, however, is that the philosophical
search that the Carter decision reflects is unfortunately tied to Canadian
history, rather than the history of the kinds of rights that bills of rights like
the Charter enshrine. There is an important difference.
The majority decision in the Carter case, it will be argued, does not
provide an interpretation of s. 3 of the Charter that is linked to any clear
vision of rights. Rather, in its decision the Court grafts together opposing
traditions of rights analysis. As it relates to critical legal concerns, the
development of a consistent vision is an important way for the Court to
address the undemocratic potential of judicial review.5 9 A clearer, more
consistent vision of rights promises to structure and place limits upon the
scope of interpretive discretion. If nothing else, this would serve the
democratic purpose of making the Charter's meaning mildly more
predictable for those who are supposed to enjoy its protections.' Therefore,
rather than the metaphor of sculptors that Justice McLachlin has used to
describejudges who are engaged in Charter interpretation,6' this suggests
that a more appropriate metaphor would be that of model kit builders.
58. Ibid. at 181.
59. Having been in the constitutionally entrenched bill of rights game a lot longer than
Canadians, Americans have developed a rich debate in relation to the seeming "moral
incoherence" that is represented by the institution of judicial review of the morality, political
or otherwise, of government activity. For a valuable overview of this debate with particular
reference to the situation of Ronald Dworkin's work within it, see D. Richards, "Rules,
Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional
Adjudication" (1977) I1 Ga. L. Rev. 1069.
60. In discussing the characteristics of the rule of law in a democracy, Justice McLachlin
cites with approval Professor G. Walker's twelve basic requirements for that concept.
Professor Walker's third requirement is that "[olrdinary (substantive) law should possess
certainty, generality and equality" (emphasis added). From The Rule of Law: Foundations of
a Constitutional Democracy (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1988) at 23-24.
Cited in B. McLachlin, "Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada" (1992) 56 Sask.
L. Rev. 167 at 169.
61. Justice McLachlin writes (ibid. at 170-171): "The Charter has introduced vast and
important new areas of judicial discretion. The language in which the rights and freedoms are
cast is broad and open-textured. What does free speech mean? Liberty? Equality? The right to
vote? Judges faced with this sort of language must shape and carve and sometimes limit it, like
a sculptor shapes a stone, finding the ultimate shape within the undefined block."
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For better or for worse, the best candidate for such a theory is the one
that brought us bills of rights in the first place: the variant of liberal
individualism that places certain fights above positive law. This theoretical
perspective recommends itself as an interpretive guide at least for those
rights in the Charter that trace their pedigree to the modem flowering of
the idea that equal individuals, rather than social, economic, or cultural
classes or groups, are the basic unit of society. In this theoretical context,
bills of rights are tools to assist individuals in safeguarding the personal
sovereignty that is "naturally" theirs, from the threat of a central power
to which the individuals have given the authority to govern for specific
limited purposes. The concept of individual rights and liberties, and the
need for a constitutionalized bill to protect them, "makes sense" in this
context, however problematic the logic of individualism may be in
application. Furthermore, the concept of rights fits only awkwardly in the
context of more communitarian social and political philosophies.
62
The right to vote must be recognized as being central to this liberal
individualist outlook. As such, one would expect it to be characterized in
a manner that is consistent with such principles. The modem human
rights conversation began in the crucible of the events of seventeenth
century England in particular.63 This conversation is critically tied to what
was then a radical notion of the possibility of individual existence outside
of civil society-in the state of nature-and the equality of individuals in
that state.64 The rights-bearing capacity of individuals is a correlate of
62. The debate in this regard is a fascinating one. Aspects of it are canvassed in A.A. An-
Naim, ed., Human Rights in Cross- Cultural Perspectives: A Questfor Consensus (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). Also, see R. Howard, Human Rights and the Search
for Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) [hereinafter Howard].
63. The great "liberal moment" in this period can be dramatically (if not particularly
accurately) pin-pointed as occurring when the axe separated Charles l's head from the rest of
his body on January 20, 1649. This culminating event of the English Civil War initiated a search
for a theory of political legitimacy to make sense out of such spectacular and brutal exercises
of power. T. Hobbes' Leviathan, published in the wake of Charles I's execution (1651) and
during Oliver Cromwell's protectorate, was indicative of that search. Hobbes famously argued
that the journey from the natural state of war toward civil society requires people to submit to
the near absolute authority of a mortal God (one person or assembly of people): the "great
Leviathan." [T. Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1985), Chapter XVII, "Making of the
Commonwealth" at 227.] Also, in Chapter XIII, "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind"
Hobbes writes at 185: "Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre."
64. While Hobbes argued that a perpetual state of war awaits outside civil society, this
identification of an "outside" is essential to the liberal nature of his work. It represents a direct
challenge to hierarchical, organic social models. Such models supported the theory of the
Monarchy's divine right to rule upon which Charles I relied to justify his arbitrary and
absolutist dealings with Parliament, and according to which the existence of individuality
outside of a divinely constructed social pyramid with a Monarch on top was unthinkable.
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human equality. Furthermore, this liberal individualist outlook identified
civil society or the state as a creation of the people who were subject to
its authority. The most influential stream of this theory, initiated by John
Locke,65 made the legitimacy of state authority contingent upon the
degree to which it preserved the liberties that people naturally had. Bills
of rights developed as markers of these spheres of liberty.66
Accordingly, bills of classic liberal rights are artifacts of this particular
theoretical context. Such bills are most comprehensible-and their
meaning therefore requires the leastjudicial mediation-in the context of
this stream of liberal individualist theory. It promises to provide the most
structure for the interpretation of those Charter guarantees that represent
Furthermore, if human rights are "rights one has simply because one is a human
being,"[J. Donelly, Universal Humtan Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989) at 9] then Hobbes identified the first of these to be independent from any divine
power's benevolence: the right to life (Hobbes, supra note 63 at 189.) Finally, along with the
identification of "natural," rights-bearing individuality, Hobbes' authoritarian vision of civil
society is premised upon the essential liberal themes of the equality of individuals and their
mutual agreement to enter a commonwealth (ibid. at 183).
65. John Locke provided the most direct source of inspiration for bills of rights like the
Charter in his Second Treatise of Government (1690). The First Treatise having disposed of
the theory of the divine right of monarchs, the Second Treatise had several purposes. The work
was published immediately after the events of the bloodless "Glorious Revolution" when the
Whig faction in Parliament was instrumental in replacing James It, a Catholic monarch whom
they opposed, with William of Orange and Mary, Protestants who were more sympathetic to
their interests. It was Locke's project to demonstrate how these events represented the working
out of natural laws rather than the outcome of raw power and violence. Locke identified the
purpose of his Second Treatise in the following terms: "[T]o establish the throne of our great
restorer, our present King William - to make good his title in the consent of the people... ;
and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights,
with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery
and ruin." Quoted in T. Peardon' s introduction to J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952) at x.
66. As well as "explaining" the legitimacy of the Glorious Revolution, the Second Treatise
was aimed at undermining Hobbes' suggestion that civil society depends upon people's
willingness to suspend their natural liberties and to submit to the absolute power of a sovereign
in order to benefit from the security of that arrangement. The state of nature is less fearsome
in Locke's vision and the scope of natural liberty wider (ibid. at 4-5). Hobbes' right to life is
expanded to include liberty and property, all of which are maintained under the "law of nature"
which holds that "being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions."(ibid., at 5). Significantly, Locke's rights vision depends upon
a Deity. There is, therefore, less need for civil society on the part of the individual who enjoys
freedom and equality in the state of nature. Concomitantly, when civil society does arise as a
result of people's agreement to avoid the "inconveniences of the state of nature"(ibid at 9),
chief among which is having to punish transgressors of the law of nature, the sovereign body
is under a greater obligation to its subjects, upon whose pleasure its authority rests. The
outstanding example that this era provided of something like a social contract was the English
Declaration or Bill of Rights, passed by the Convention Parliament in 1689, and signed by
William as a pre-condition of his ascension to the throne.
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its correlates. The right to vote is one of those guarantees. While not a
classic natural liberty per se, it represents an articulation of the
understanding that a legitimate ruler's authority is exercised at the
pleasure of an equal people, all of whom have retained their sovereignty
and are equally possessed of certain natural liberties. The ability to call
the government to account, therefore, is critically tied to the protection of
these liberties. In this context, damage is done to the whole notion of
people as equal rights-bearing individuals which, again, is the assumption
that explains why bills of rights are necessary, if some people have a
stronger ability to call the government to account than do others.
4. The Logic(s) of Rights Analysis
To some significant extent, therefore, instruments like the Charter and
the American Bill ofRights represent a working out and institutionalization
of Lockean social contract theory. 67 Ironically, however, the American
and Canadian constitutional bills of rights which are placed above and
made immune from regular legislation, mandate a style of reasoning and
argument in the legal systems of these countries that was not imposed
upon the country out of which the idea arose, England.68 In the Second
Treatise Locke deduces the existence of natural rights from the presumed
inability to doubt God's existence and the Deity's imposition of the law
of nature. 69 From this indubitable point Locke steps down, in a process of
reasoning, to identify the rights to life, liberty, and property. The
deductive or rationalist nature of this exercise is important.7° The meaning
of these rights and liberties cannot be discerned by induction through the
67. "The lineage is direct: Jefferson copied Locke .... In political theory and in political
practice the American Revolution drew its inspiration from the parliamentary struggle of the
seventeenth century." Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence (1922), quoted in
T. Peardon's introduction to John Locke's The Second Treatise of Government, ibid. at xx.
68. In the context of the United Kingdom's unwritten constitutional regime, the Declaration
of Rights, like the Magna Carta (1279), is a regular, if extraordinary, statutory instrument. The
Declaration has no immunity from the regular legislative process and, therefore, it can be
altered by this process.
69. In contemporary terms, this point arises in relation to the challenge that human rights
advocates face in trying to establish a non-religious basis for their convictions. Their critics
argue that only such a non-religious basis can allow their theory to escape the criticism that
human rights standards are morally or culturally relative and, therefore, cannot claim status
which is superior to the sorts of social relations or government practices that they are being used
to challenge. See Howard, supra note 62.
70. Not least because Locke' sAn Essay on Human Understanding represents the fountainhead
of modern empiricism which establishes inductive reasoning as the route to true knowledge.
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observation of existing positive law in a society. These principles draw
their authority from a source that is beyond and prior to that society. The
entire rights-enshrining exercise only makes sense, in fact, insofar as
those rights provide a separate critical perspective upon government
activity and indicate the way in which that activity must be resisted or
reformed. This, then, is indicative of deontological or non-consequentialist
reasoning." The rights in question have an inherent value that does not
arise from the regular positive law against which they represent standards
of comparison. Neither is the value of these rights relative to the
consequences of their application.
In contrast with this, an empirical, inductive tradition of rights analysis
has dominated Englishjurisprudence. This tradition supported the common
law's position on liberty that "a person is free to do anything that is not
positively prohibited" by the law." According to this model of analysis,
the character and scope of individual liberty that the law recognizes-
and, therefore, an understanding of what an individual has a right to do-
is not defined by absolute statements of principle. Rather, spheres of
individual liberty are defined by the rather incidental absence of legal
restraints. Furthermore, no constitutional guarantees exist to prevent the
law from infringing upon these spheres of liberty. Thus, in his
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, Blackstone' s method of discussing
an area of law was "not to trace it back to a priori first principles, but rather
to locate it within the living body of law and to trace its historical
development."73 Rights, according to this perspective, are "coequal with
our form of government"74 rather than extra-legal entities that define the
legitimacy of that government's activity. This position is at odds with the
idea of natural, inalienable rights and liberties that became manifest in
constitutionalized bills of rights.
Liberal individualist theory, then, provides a rough but important
template for understanding the nature and role of bills of rights that
enshrine "classic" liberal guarantees in our Charter. Furthermore, the
Charter is a vehicle for a form of rights analysis that is in direct tension
71. In modern jurisprudence Ronald Dworkin provides the most famous metaphor for the
idea that "serious" rights analysis does not take account of the consequences of respecting
individual rights. Taking rights seriously involves conceding that they "trump" utilitarian
arguments as to how the greater good may be served by infringing them. R. Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
72. Hogg, supra note 56 at 580.
73. G. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
at 13.
74. W. Blacksone, Student's Blackstone, R. Kerr ed. (London: Reeve and Turner, 1890) at 15.
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with the Blackstone tradition that dominated Anglo-Canadian legal
thought before the Charter's entrenchment. Again, to put it bluntly, we
would not have a Charter but for the rationalist brand of liberal-rights
theory with its themes of individual sovereignty, equality, and the need
to curb the potentially abusive power of an "artificial" government that
constantly threatens the "natural" liberty of the citizenry. Furthermore, it
is submitted that judges' recognition of the importance of this theory and
their engagement with it is important. This promises to provide a pattern
of more structured and understandable exercises of judicial discretion
which would be, therefore, more clearly consistent with the democratic
principles that are threatened by the institution of judicial review under
the Charter.
5. Summary
It is suggested that we should be honest about the need for a clearer
philosophical map for interpreting Charterrights. This is not an indictment
of the judiciary's intellectual abilities but, rather, a concern for the law's
consistency and predictability. Furthermore, inasmuch as we can accept
the need for maps, we can also be sophisticated enough to accept that no
maps are perfect reflections of reality. Therefore, we have not failed, and
we are not lost, if we decide to stray from the complement of principles
and social assumptions we have identified as the best guide for
interpretation. This approach is more intellectually mature than relying
upon the creative abilities of a well-meaning judiciary to "sculpt" for us
a Charter reflecting their best ideas as to what uniquely "Canadian" rights
may be. Even if they should succeed, the preceding discussion has sought
to demonstrate that bills of rights only make sense as instruments that
allow critical assessment of existing laws and social practices. Accordingly,
a search for the "Canadian way" of interpretation threatens to reverse that
relationship by allowing existing laws and social practices to define the
rights themselves and thereby undermine the very reason for having a
Charter in the first place.
III. Carter v. Saskatchewan
1. Background
According to mainstream accounts of law and judicial activity, a defining
feature of legal analysis and decision-making is the extent to which it is
distinguished from politics. The liberal democratic concept of the Rule of
Law depends upon this distinction. Understandably, therefore, a great
theme of the legal realist and critical legal assault on the legal order has
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related to the lack of a substantive distinction between law and politics.75
The Carter decision offers fuel for this debate largely because it can lend
itself to characterization in support of either side. The facts giving rise to
the case certainly involved politics and the suspicion of partisan
gerrymandering on the part of the Saskatchewan Progressive Conservative
administration of Grant Devine.76 What is at issue, therefore, is whether
our legal system seems to have succeeded in identifying nonpartisan legal
principles within this most poiiticai set of facts. This is centrai to the rights
project, and a point of attack for rights critics. Furthermore, we are
interested in whether the decision that the Court generated, if undeniably
political, is only incidentally so.
In 1987, the Devine Government passed The Electoral Boundaries
Commission Act. 77 Under this legislation, the Commission that it created
was instructed to redraw the province's election map in such a way as to
respect several extraordinary conditions that were unknown to the work
of electoral boundary commissions in Saskatchewan before that time. In
calling for the creation of 66 electoral ridings in Saskatchewan, the
legislation mandated the establishment of one blunt division in the
province, and myriad of more intricate ones. The blunt division was
between northern and southern Saskatchewan. The effect of this division
was to ensure that the sparsely populated but spacious northern part of the
province would have at least 2 seats out of the 66 in the provincial
legislature. Of more concern, however, was the way in which the
remaining 64 electoral districts were to be divided in such a way as to
respect the integrity of a newly identified fundamental division of interest
among the electorate in rural and urban areas. This strategy seemed
guaranteed to maximize the governing party's chances of retaining power
on the basis of the support of a minority of people in the province. 78
As the respondent's facturn in the Carter case argued, the E.B.C.A.
sought to "quarantine" the large urban centres in Saskatchewan7 9 in an
75. For an overview of this debate as waged during the 1980s, see A. Altman, Critical Legal
Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapter 3, "The
Possibility of the Rule of Law."
76. This sentiment was certainly supported by editorialists at the time. In responding to the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Carter, a Saskatoon Star Phoenix article "Power
Politics Still in Force" (8 June 1991) C9 marked the loss of hope that "the court would put an
end to the Tories' crass political ploy to retain power." Also, see supra note 14.
77. S.S. 1986-87-88, c. E-6.1 [hereinafter E.B.C.A.].
78. For an overview of the partisan motivations that characterized this era in Saskatchewan's
political history, see James M. Pitsula & K. Rasmussen, Privatizing a Province: The New Right
in Saskatchewan, supra note 14.
79. Factum of Roger Carter, paragraph 42.
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apparent attempt to prevent the interests of populations in these areas
from infecting rural interests. The legislation dictated that in drawing the
new electoral boundary map, the Commission had to recognize seven
urban centres, each of which contained a specified number of seats
totalling 29 in all. The quarantining aspect of this exercise was enhanced
by s. 15 of E.B.C.A. requiring urban boundaries to be drawn so as to
coincide precisely with municipal limits. 8° The area outside of these
seven urban centres was left to be divided among the remaining 35 rural
seats.
For the purposes of determining the parity of voting power among
electoral districts, an electoral quotient is established by dividing the
number of voters by the number of districts that are to be drawn.
Accordingly, voting parity is achieved when the number of electors in
each riding is roughly the same as the quotient. Since absolute parity is
an impossible goal8' the enabling legislation for boundary commissions
usually contains a permissible range of variations from the electoral
quotient. With the E.B. C.A. the permissible variation for the province of
Saskatchewan rose from +/- 15% under the previous legislation,
to +/- 25%.82
The new legislation gave rise to a range of legal concerns, including
administrative law arguments that the Commission's discretion had been
fettered by the restrictions that the E.B.C.A. placed upon its work. More
to the point for the purposes of this discussion, however, is the product of
the Commission's work. This was an electoral map, defined in The
Representation Act, 1989.83 Given the electoral quotient of +/- 25% and
the mandatory rural-urban distinctions, the situation was such that at the
extreme, 100 votes in the smallest constituency, Saskatoon Sutherland,
were equal to 164 in the largest, Saskatoon Greystone. Furthermore, these
districts bordered each other!84
80. Section 15 of the E. C.B.A. reads: "The boundaries of a proposed urban constituency shall
not extend beyond the municipal boundaries of the urban municipality of which it is
composed." S.S. 1986-87-88, c. E-6.1, s. 15(2).
81. As McLachlin J. pointed out in her decision in Carter, supra note 13 at 184. It is not clear,
however, why McLachlin J. seems to suggest that this impossibility is part of an argument for
being less generally vigilant about the principle of equal voting.
82. Section 20 of E.B.C.A., reads in part: A Commission, in determining the area to be
included in and in fixing the boundaries of all proposed constituencies:
(a) shall determine a constituency population quotient by dividing the voter population
by the number of constituencies, from which:
(i) no proposed southern constituency population shall vary ... by more than 25%;
83. S.S. 1989-90, c. R-20.2
84. Factum of Roger Carter, at 13.
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2. At the Supreme Court of Canada
The Carter case arrived at the Supreme Court of Canada in April, 1991,
on Crown appeal from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision the
preceding March." The Saskatchewan government had been forced to
respond to the criticism raised against the new electoral boundaries and
the legislative regime responsible for them. This criticism initially
manifested itself in a proposed Charter challenge by the respondent in
Carter. At the suggestion of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan, the
matter was instead referred to the Appeal Court for a ruling as to the
constitutionality of the restrictions placed upon the Boundary
Commission's mandate, and the resulting product. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that both the process and the product offended the
Constitution's guarantee of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter and
that they represented unreasonable infringements under section 1 of the
Charter.
An outline of the Supreme Court of Canada's majority decision in
Carter has already been given in this discussion. It will be recalled that
McLachlin J.'s reasons recognized the prime importance of relative
parity of voting power for the meaning of s. 3. According to the decision,
however, this emphasis upon equality of voting is subject to compromise
in the interests of the broader concept of effective representation. Among
the "countervailing factors" that compete with parity of voting power in
giving substance to the Canadian right to vote are geography, community
history, community interests, and minority representation.86 Furthermore,
we are to understand that these are "but examples of considerations which
may justify departure from absolute voter parity in pursuit of more
effective representation; the list is not closed."87 One is left with the
impression that the principle of one person, one vote will become
incrementally less important for our understanding of the meaning of
s. 3 as countervailing factors are added to the unclosed list.
This significance of the Carter decision has been thoughtfully analyzed
in a number of articles. David Johnson, for example, expresses concern
about the Court's attempt to develop a "pluralistic" notion of the right to
vote with the non-egalitarian factors that it identifies as being able to
contribute to the concept of effective representation. As laudable as these
pluralist sentiments may be in a diverse country like Canada, Johnson
85. Reference Re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Sask.), ss. 14, 20 (1991), 78 D.L.R.
(4th) 449 (Sask. C.A.).
86. Carter, supra note 13 at 184.
87. Ibid., at 184.
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argues that they provide none of the certainty and direction for judicial
interpretation offered by a clear emphasis upon voting parity.88 Kent
Roach develops an opposing line of argument that is probably the best
defence of the Supreme Court's remarkable rejection of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal's unanimous decision. Roach argues that the Carter
decision reflects an important sensitivity on the part of the Court to
concerns for the kind of substantivejustice that Charters. I 5j urisprudence
has recognized.8 9 According to thisjurisprudence, real equality sometimes
demands different treatment. Professor Roach welcomes the extent to
which the Carter decision may facilitate progressive developments such
as enhanced democratic power for groups of people who have suffered
from an historic lack of representation.90
The suggestion that s. 15 establishes a standard of interpretation for
other Charter guarantees is problematic. In fact, this position undermines
the uniqueness of the anti-discrimination theme represented by s. 15 in
the context of the Charter as a whole. The provision of "four equalities"
under s. 15 (equality before and under the law, and equal protection and
benefit from the law) was designed to compel the courts to engage in
substantive, socially contextualized equality analysis. This kind of
substantive analysis of the effects upon equality of government activity
contrasts with the restrictive interpretation that the Supreme Court gave
to the Canadian Bill of Rights' guarantee of "the right of the individual
to equality before the law and the protection of the law." 9' Martha Minow
88. D. Johnson, "Canadian Electoral Boundaries and the Courts: Practices, Principles and
Problems" (1994) 39 McGill L. J. 224.
89. Charter s. 15 reads: "(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and in particular
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability; (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." Supra note 12.
90. K. Roach, "Chartering the Electoral Map Into the Future" in J. Courtney, P. MacKinnon
& D.E. Smith, eds., Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values, supra,
note 11, at 200.
91. S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1(b). Justice McIntyre's analysis of the wording of Charters. 15(1)
in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia et al., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter
Andrews], with which the entire Court concurred (while dividing on the disposition), indicates
that s. 15's wording is a direct response to the Bill of Rights equality jurisprudence. Thus in
Andrews the Supreme Court of Canada took advantage of the wording of Charters. 15 to break
from the "similarly situated" principle of equality that had been dominant before that time. This
concept of equality concerns itself only with the treatment of people in relation to others who
are similarly situated. It is not offended by inequalities that may exist among differently
situated people. Section 15 is not the only right that represents an exception to the conventional
Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries
and Elizabeth Spelman capture the theme of substantive equality analysis.
It involves identifying and responding to the way in which the "apparently
neutral and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does
not share the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied,
heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written.
9 2
The assumption of the "sameness" of individuals which makes legal
rules neutral and universally applicable is characteristic of the formal
equality perspective which is, in turn, the basis for conventional libel.
rights theory. In this way s. 15 promises to operate as an important
exception to, and a modifying force against, the other Charter guarantees
that represent correlates of this theoretical perspective. The open-ended
language of the section, with its allusion to the existence of non-
enumerated grounds of invidious discrimination thatjudges are invited to
identify, compels the sort of pluralist inquiry that is essential when
assessing equality rights in a culturally and ethnically diverse country.93
This, however, is clearly an exceptional ambit of discretion that should
be understood to arise out of the exceptional wording of that section.
While the wording of s. 15 compels judges to engage in a relatively
wide-open interpretive exercise, that is not the case in relation to the right
to vote when it is placed in the context of the liberal individualist theory
that gives the clearest meaning and rational unity to most of the other
Charter rights, and explains the existence of bills of rights in general.
Furthermore, the factors that give the Carter decision its important
pluralist spirit-all of which are cited in opposition to the principle of
voting equality-could be raised in the context of a consideration as to
whether the infringement of s. 3 was reasonable under Charter s. 1.
Although this should not have saved the statutory regime under
consideration in the Carter case, it would keep that possibility open for
liberal rights and freedoms contained in the Charter. As pointed out by Alan Blakeney in a
interview with Murray Dobbin for the C.B.C. Ideas program entitled "Democracy and the
Politics of Human Rights" there is no "human" right per se to the kinds of language, education
and mobility fights that the Charter contains. Section 15, however, can be distinguished from
the rights which reflect Canadian political realities, in that the equality guarantee is consistent
with currents of contemporary human rights thought, some of which runs contrary to the spirit
of conventional liberal rights.
92. M. Minow & E. Spelman, "In Context" (1990) 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597 at 1601.
93. Section 15 protects against discrimination "and in particular" against discrimination on
certain enumerated grounds. This structure suggests that there is a larger set of grounds of
unconstitutional discrimination of which s. 15 provides a few examples. Accordingly, the
Court is compelled to make inquiries as to what these grounds might be on the basis of an
understanding of the characteristics that enumerated grounds seem to share. See Andrews,
supra note 91.
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future cases. If this suggests the prospect of never-ending litigation of
electoral boundaries, the Carter decision has not saved us from that. By
establishing an open list of factors the Court has suggested that it will
entertain ongoing candidates for principles that can outweigh voting
parity as a defining factor of the right to vote.
3. The Carter Decision and the Logic(s) of Rights Analysis
An earlier part of this discussion argued that democratic concerns about
judicial review under the Charter would be addressed to some degree by
a pattern of analysis more consistently linked to the form of deductive
reasoning that attends the theory of natural rights. It was also suggested
that this pattern of rationalist legal analysis is in tension with the inductive
empirical method of analysis that has dominated English jurisprudence.
Deductive, rationalist analysis of rights is also inconsistent with
consequentialism. Consequentialist or teleological argument implies that
the nature and value of a principle is relative to the consequences it
produces.94 The Carter case evinces an attempt to graft these inconsistent
traditions together. This is a matter of concern for several reasons. One
is that the inductive, empirical method of analysis undermines the very
need for a Charter. Such reasoning implies that the Charter's provisions
are only a distillation of the law we already have. If that is the case, then
it is not at all clear why we need a Charter to provide this strange outline
of the themes of our existing positive law.
An inductive approach to defining the right to vote would involve a
consideration of the way in which that activity has been recognized in
Canadian law up until now. If applied generally, this deference to
tradition would, of course, prevent Charterrights from acting as standards
of critical comparison for our law. Such a role is the only clear rationale
for constitutionally entrenched bills of rights. Notwithstanding that, and
notwithstanding the fact that voting rights in Canada illustrate the most
94. Consequentialist analysis is essentially utilitarian. In utilitarian terms the morality,
correctness, orjustice of a particular direction of government policy (for example) is dependent
upon the amount of good or happiness that it produces in relation to alternative policy choices.
This, then, implies that super-legal principles or rights that have self-evident value and restrict
legitimate government activity do not restrict the law, itself the reflection of these policy
choices. Such rights would prevent the utilitarian calculation of the greatest good. This, then,
describes the separation of law and principles of morality (i.e., rights) which is the cornerstone
of legal positivism. H.L.A. Hart's work has been the most prominent articulation of this
perspective in the post World War II era. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961).
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discriminatory aspects of our legal history,9 5 the Carter decision is
remarkable for the extent to which it reflects this kind of deference.
Early in her decision for the majority, McLachlin J. cites John A.
Macdonald's non-egalitarian sentiments 96 in support of her argument as
to voting parity's lack of absolute primacy for the meaning of Charter
s. 3. This is followed shortly by the observation that "there is little in the
history or philosophy of Canadian democracy that suggests that the
framers of the Charter in enacting s. 3 had as their ultimate goal the
attainment of voter parity."97 It is not clear why the framers' intention
should concern the Court in this context when it has not done so
elsewhere. 98
McLachlin J. goes some way toward minimizing the extent to which
this approach implies a Blackstone-type of commitment to interpreting
Charter rights. Her Ladyship states:
This is not to suggest, however, that inequities in our voting system are to
be accepted merely because they have historical precedent. History is
important in so far as it suggests that the philosophy underlying the
development of the right to vote in this country is the broad goal of
effective representation."
It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning in this regard seems
strikingly circular. This is because the concept of effective representation
was, of course, first enunciated in this decision itself. The Court then
proceeds to draw upon historical references to assist us in understanding
that concept. In the passage quoted above, however, effective
representation is being used to limit the significance of that historical
source of its own meaning. Clearly, then, we are at the Court's mercy in
our attempts to discern within the historical record those aspects consistent
with effective representation-and therefore the right to vote-and those
aspects inconsistent with effective representation. Many of us, for example,
thought that a history of unequal voting power would be inconsistent with
a Charter of rights that places a premium on equality.
95. See "Discrimination", supra note 30.
96. Carter, supra note 13 at 184.
97. Ibid. at 185. In his accompanying decision, Justice Sopinka makes the same point (at 197).
98. The most prominent example is probably Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486. Among the issues in the case was whether Charter s. 7's reference to
"fundamental justice" mandated substantive judicial review. In that case Lamer J. (as he then
was) for the majority rejected clear evidence (testimony before the Special Joint Committee
examining the text of the Charter) that the section was only intended to mandate procedural
review. Accordingly, the judiciary has "gone substantive" ever since.
99. Carter, supra note 13 at 187.
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By implicating the judiciary so deeply in our ongoing understanding
of s. 3 of the Charter, the Carter decision succeeds in producing a net gain
in the potential power that can be exercised by both the judicial and
legislative branches of government. The judiciary will mediate our
understanding of the relationship between our history and the nature of
our rights, and legislatures can engage in a scope of electoral manipulation
at least as broad as that which gave rise to the Carter case. To return to
the rationale for bills of rights, as outlined in the preceding text and
footnotes, they manifest a concern that the exercise of power by all three
branches of government-executive, legislative, and judicial-needs to
be kept in check. Thejurisprudence relating to Charters. 32, outlining the
branches of government whose conduct is subject to Charter, supports
this point. 00
The deference to legal tradition and history in the interpretation of the
right to vote is, then, a strategy of analysis that conflicts with the treatment
of rights as "first principles" against which the rest of the legal order is to
be compared. Reasoning from first principles is essential to the theory of
rights that is responsible for, and which explains the existence of, bills of
rights like our Charter. This theory of rights is also inconsistent with the
consequentialism that characterizes aspects of the Carter decision.
Consequentialist analysis makes these rights relative to the judiciary's
assessment of the consequences of respecting them. This undermines the
tenet of rights theory that suggests that these standards have inherent
value. Furthermore, this form of consequentialist analysis is precisely
what s. 1 of the Charter is capable of providing in a manner that does not
damage the logical fabric-and therefore the potential for a general
understanding-of the substance of the right itself.
This aspect of the majority decision in Carter is subtle but significant.
It arises in the context of McLachlin J.'s consideration of the conditions
of effective representation and the relationship of equal voting power to
that concept. Her Ladyship states:
A system which dilutes one citizen's vote unduly as compared with
another citizen's vote runs the risk of providing inadequate representation
to the citizen whose vote is diluted. The legislative power of the citizen
whose vote is diluted will be reduced, as may be access to and assistance
from his or her representative. The result will be uneven and unfair
representation. 10'
100. See M. Carter, "Non-Statutory Criminal Law and the Charter: The Application of the
Swain Approach in R. v. Daviault" (1995) 59 Sask. L. Rev. 241.
101. Carter, supra note 13 at 183-4.
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This is essentially the extent of the Court's consideration of the
significance of the one person, one vote principle for the meaning of
Charter s. 3. The decision then proceeds to consider the ways that this
concern is mitigated by the benefits that the dilution of votes can bring.
It should be noted, therefore, that the value of the principle of basic
individual equality that voting parity supports is considered entirely in
relation to the consequences attending its infringement. The possibility
that it has inherent value is not considered. In fact, such a possibility is
essential to the project of taking rights seriously. Clear analysis of the
substance of the kinds of human fights or principles that liberal individualist
bills of rights enshrine, cannot be related entirely to a consideration of
their consequences. It must be seriously assumed that they have some
value in and of themselves. Consequentialist analysis is only appropriate
in the context of a discussion as to when limitation of those rights is
reasonable.
4. The Right to Vote as a "Qualified Right"
The Carter decision suggests that the creation of unequal voting districts,
an important if not conclusive indicator of an abuse of political power, is
a rather unexceptional characteristic of the right to vote in this country.
A clear lack of voting parity is not, as one might have expected, an
exceptional side-effect or a kind of necessary evil that may attend the
pursuit of some important social objectives that governments should be
prepared to justify in the context of Charter s. 1 analysis. The fact that
voting inequality is embraced by the scope of Charter s. 3 rather than
being identified as a limitation upon the substance of that right that may
or may not be justified in a free and democratic society, is of more than
symbolic significance. This state of affairs makes the right to vote
essentially a "qualified right," at least insofar as voting parity is concerned.
Qualified rights are those Charter guarantees limited by their own
terms or, in this example, by the Court's interpretation of their substance. 02
Such a reading of limits into the substance of a right is more common with
bills of rights that do not contain express limitation clauses. The outstanding
example is, again, the American one. The United States Bill of Rights
102. The Legal Rights section of the Charter contains a number of rights that are qualified
by their own terms. Uncontroversial examples are s. 8, which guarantees everyone the right to
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure (emphasis added). Similarly, s. 9 provides
everyone with the right not to be arbitrarily detained. Concomitantly, therefore, everyone does
not have a right to be secure from reasonable search or seizure, or non-arbitrary detention or
imprisonment. Supra note 12.
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contains no express limitation clause and, accordingly, American courts
have had to identify implied qualifications in order to allow legislative
restraints upon rights."0 3
The effect of a Charter right's qualified nature is to place upon the
party challenging the constitutionality of government activity the obligation
to prove that it represents not only an infringement of a Charter-protected
principle, but an unjustifiable infringement as well. In the context of the
right to vote, it will be incumbent upon someone challenging unequal
voting districts to anticipate which of the countervailing factors the
government might point to as being served by this inequality, and to
undermine that argument. As we have seen, this is an open-ended list of
factors that includes, but is not restricted to geography and community of
interests. The government will, of course, be allowed to defend itself from
these allegations during this first stage of Charterreview. If the challenger
is successful at this stage, then the government will have a second chance
to defend its actions through Charter s. I analysis. Here the onus shifts
to the party wishing to uphold an infringement to establish its
reasonableness on a balance of probabilities."°
A closer equation of the right to vote with the principle of voting parity
would lower the threshold for an infringement of Charter s. 3. This would
bring the analysis under s. I more quickly, relieving the burden upon the
parties with the least resources-those challenging government action-
and compelling governments to be forthcoming about their rationales for
creating unequal voting districts.
5. Summary
The Carter decision presents an ironic spectacle. It suggests that the
Court is engaging in the apparently democratic practice of deferring to
our representative institutions. It does so, however, in relation to conduct
that threatens the representative nature of those institutions. We may be
glad to see that our courts are prepared to strike this deferential attitude.
If it has a place in this situation, however, it is in the context of s. 1 where
non-rights-based analysis can be undertaken without jeopardizing the
logical structure of the substantive rights and, therefore, the public's
ability to understand them.
This suggests, then, that the deference shown to the legislature in the
Carter case, though commendable in its own way, is misplaced.
103. Hogg, supra note 56 at 669.
104. Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
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Furthermore, the attempt to characterize this position as one that flows
logically from the nature of the right compels the Court to abandon the
clear principle that would have made s. 3 most consistent with liberal
rights theory. The Carter case was a rare moment in the history of the
Charter's interpretation when the interests of majoritarianism and a
determination to "take rights seriously" (as Professor Dworkin would
have it) coincided. In the result, both of these interests lost out. This
compromised the rational fabric of Charter, and failed to facilitate the
democratic project of making the meaning of this part of the constitution
more obvious to the citizenry and less relative to the judiciary's latest
pronouncement.
IV. "Noisy" Gerrymandering: Attending to Intention
The introduction to this article identified the partisan-motivated creation
of unequal vote districts as a kind of gerrymandering that is of more
concern than the incidental production of the same results. The lack of
judicial attention to this issue before the late 1980s, and the lack of focus
upon it in the Cartercase itself, has left a lacuna in Canadian legal thought
with respect to such distinctions. This lacuna could be filled in such a way
as to bolster Charters. 3's ability to operate as a restriction upon the most
offensive forms of gerrymandering while at the same time allowing
future courts to distinguish, rather than reverse, the Carter decision.
As compared with the relative novelty of the subject in Canada, voting
rights litigation is well enough established in the American context that
clear patterns can be discerned in the case law. Bernard Grofman
identifies two major categories of issues in this area. The first relates
directly to the exercise of the franchise. The case law in this area concerns
such issues as barriers to registration and voter intimidation.
Gerrymandering falls within the second major category, identified by
Professor Grofman as vote dilution. The American experience has given
rise to three streams of case law in this regard: a) racial vote dilution;
b) partisan gerrymandering; c) one person, one vote. 0
The first of these categories relates to concerns about electoral
boundaries that dilute the voting strength of a concentration of electors
who are members of a racial minority group. This is a matter of particular
concern when the number of electors is significant enough that they might
otherwise succeed in electing a candidate who represents their interests.
As applicable as these concerns are to the Canadian context, they do not
105. Grofman, supra note 11 at 156-7.
88 The Dalhousie Law Journal
address the issues that were at large in the Carter case as directly as the
other two categories. Like the racial vote dilution category, partisan
gerrymandering can embrace situations where relative voting power is
maintained amongst electoral boundaries. However, in the context of
partisan gerrymandering, those boundaries are drawn in order to achieve
a strategic political goal. In the racial dilution example, the goal-or at
least the effect-of electoral boundary drawing is the defeat of candidates
who would represent minority interests. The goal of partisan
gerrymandering is to capture pockets of support for a political party that
would otherwise be "lost" within an electoral map that was drawn without
partisan considerations.
Finally, it is the one person, one vote category of vote dilution that is
most clearly engaged by the Carter case. Within this category the
American case law on point is dominated by a concern for a particular
variant of this kind of vote dilution, also mentioned in the introduction of
this article: silent gerrymandering. Silent gerrymandering arises when
states have failed to redraw electoral districts in response to census data
suggesting, for example, that migration to cities has effectively bolstered
the power of rural votes and that it is time for voting districts to be
readjusted accordingly. 0 6 This demographic pattern is central to the
Canadian case law in this area as well. For example, along with the Carter
case, Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney-General)'Tand Re Electoral
Boundaries Commission Act (Alta.)'08 both involved conservative
governments in British Columbia and Alberta respectively, attempting to
shore up their traditional support from a shrinking rural electorate.
Returning to the issue of intention, its importance in the American
context relates primarily to the categories of racial vote dilution and
partisan gerrymandering. As discussed above, these kinds of electoral
boundary manipulations are not necessarily reflected in vote inequality
between districts. Accordingly, intention is more of an issue because
without it, the negative consequences of such conduct are less tangible
and less clearly offensive to democratic principles than the inequalities
which attend one person, one vote dilution. To generalize upon Professor
Grofman's analysis, the case law suggests that proof of intent to commit
these forms of vote dilution is necessary in orderto establish a constitutional
violation. Accordingly, the case law on point establishes various tests for
satisfying the burden of proving intent.19
106. Ibid., at 158. For case law on point, see supra note 7.
107. (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.S.C.).
108. (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (Alta.C.A.).
109. Grofman, supra note II at 164.
Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries
In the context of one person, one vote litigation, however, the sole fact
that electoral boundaries are established in such a way as to give more
weight to some electors' votes establishes a prima facie case of
constitutional infringement. Furthermore, although somewhat separate
standards have developed in relation to state legislative and congressional
elections respectively, American law is considerably less tolerant of
deviations from the principle of equal voting power than is the case in
Canada after Carter. Permissible variations from the number of electors
in a district that would satisfy absolute vote equality have been generally
restricted by the Supreme Court to 10% and never allowed above 16%.
Professor Grofman identifies the one person, one vote jurisprudence as
a settled area of American election law, "the very model of mechanical
jurisprudence." "
In her decision for the majority in Carter, McLachlin J. characterized
the American emphasis upon equal voting as "radical" as compared to the
"pragmatic" Canadian approach to the matter in the pre-Charter era. "I It
is extraordinary that the majority decision expresses surprise at the notion
that the Charter demands a reconsideration of the law in this area. This
relates to points made earlier as to the Court's lack of consistent regard
for the fact that bills of rights only make sense if they are assumed to be
vehicles for critically analyzing the legal landscape, rather than framing
the one that already exists. Furthermore, the idea of the Charter as a force
for change is one that the Court has not hesitated to embrace in other areas
of the law. Judicial Charterreview in the criminal law area provides many
examples.211 It is interesting as well that the majority justifies its rejection
of the possibility that the right to vote enshrines the principle of vote
equality by saying that this would demonstrate an intention to "adopt an
American model." The Court fails to consider the possibility that the
110. Ibid. at 159.
111. Carter, supra note 13 at 185.
112. A few well known examples include: R. v. Oakes (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.),
holding that s. 8 of the Narcotics ControlAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47, represents an unreasonable
infringement of Charter s. 11 (d); R. v. Swain (1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.), holding that
the common law rule that allows the prosecution to adduce evidence of an accused person's
insanity, against that person's wishes, is an unreasonable violation of Charter s. 7; R. v.
Martineau (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), holding that Criminal Code s. 230, the
"constructive murder" provision, in particular section 230(a), is an unreasonable infringement
of Charter sections 7 and 11 (d), by removing from the Crown the obligation to prove that an
accused person had subjective foresight of death; R. v. Daviault (1994), 33 C.R. (4th) 165
(S.C.C.), holding that common law restrictions upon the defence of intoxication is an
unreasonable infringement of Charters. 7 ; R. v. Heywood (1994), 34 C.R. (4th) 133 (S.C.C.)
holding that Criminal Code s. 179, the vagrancy provision, violates Charters. 7 and is not saved
by s.1.
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Americans have embraced a principle that makes the most sense in the
context of the kind of individual rights analysis that constitutionally
entrenched bills of rights impose.
The "silent gerrymandering" that led to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Baker v. Carr'3 was achieved by inactivity on the part
of the government. By comparison the legislative agenda initiated by the
government of Saskatchewan that was destined to result in a similar
advantage for rural electors, was very noisy. Accordingly, we do not risk
mimicking the Americans' "radical" example by trying to ensure that our
constitutionally enshrined right to vote is not radically ambivalent to
extreme examples of anti-democratic political manoeuvring.
Unfortunately, the Carter decision provides no guidance in this regard.
It is suggested that evidence of intention-real or constructive-
should have a clear place in Canada's jurisprudence relating to electoral
boundaries and the Charter. If our courts were receptive to arguments as
to governments' intention to pursue partisan advantage by manipulating
electoral boundaries, then the Supreme Court's desire to establish a less
radical approach for Canada, as compared with the United States, in
relation to electoral boundary manipulation, would still be satisfied. As
compared with the Americans' sweeping concern for all lack of voting
parity, Canadians would focus constitutional attention only upon those
examples of this phenomenon most clearly consistent with the realization
of partisan political advantage.
As suggested above, in the American context intention to dilute votes
does not have to be proven in relation to one person, one vote cases. This
means that American constitutional law is capable of addressing all
situations where such intention actually does exist, and those where it
does not but the effect is the same. In Canada we may be more willing to
accept some of these unintentional non-egalitarian effects of electoral
boundary manipulation. Surely, however, such toleration should not
extend to situations where the evidence suggests, on a balance of
probabilities, an intention to dilute votes for partisan purposes. This is the
case even if that partisan intention should happen to coincide with certain
hypothetical "countervailing factors" (which, on the facts of the Carter
case, were not clearly made out). In this regard, the Canadian approach,
with its narrower focus of constitutional concern, emerges as a more
modest-less "radical"-approach to gerrymandering, but one that is
still clearly opposed to that practice.
113. Baxter, supra note 7.
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It might also be suggested that, even when evidence of intention to
gerrymander falls short of a balance of probabilities, the fact that partisan
benefit would result from a proposed re-drawing of electoral boundaries
should have some effect on the permissible variation issue. For example,
if a variation from the electoral quotient of +/- 25% is reasonable when
countervailing factors are well made out, it is less reasonable when the
electoral boundaries being proposed would also result in a windfall for the
party in power.
It is submitted that this attention to the issue of "intention," which has
a place in American election law, would allow the Canadian constitution's
guarantee of the right to vote to provide a more satisfactory bulwark
against gerrymandering than the Carter decision seems to allow. Having
said that, to the extent that the Court in Carter did not address the intention
issue, this approach may be seen as a refinement of that decision, rather
than a repudiation of it." 4
Conclusion
This analysis of the Carter decision has emphasized its failure to
correspond to the theory of rights most appropriately applied to bills of
rights like the Charter. It is suggested that closer adherence to this theory
by the judiciary would go some way toward addressing concerns about
the democratic legitimacy of judicial review and Charter interpretation.
In the specific context of voting rights, the recommendation of this theory
of interpretation serves another purpose as well. It provides a means for
addressing the kind of partisan political manoeuvring by governments
that led to the Carter case. Gerrymandering activity is uniquely threatening
to the citizenry's ability to call the ruler to account. This is the democratic
practice that the strand of liberal theory that inspired bills of rights is
supposed to protect. Therefore, an ability to establish a meaningful line
of defence against this kind of abuse of power by a government is
essential to the legitimacy of the Charter as a whole.
The Carter decision does not address the issue of gerrymandering
directly. This omission may in fact work in favour of those who are
concerned about this kind of activity. As suggested in the discussion of
114. 1 am distinguishing my point here from the good one that is made by R.E. Fritz in "The
Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Case and Its Implications," where he suggests that a
reconsideration of the electoral quotient would require the Supreme Court to readdress the
question as a tabula rasa. In J. Courtney, P. MacKinnon, & D.E. Smith, eds., Drawing
Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992)70 at 86.
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noisy gerrymandering, it might be argued that the Court has not yet ruled
on the issue of "intention" to dilute votes. This is particularly the case in
situations where evidence of that intention, objective or otherwise,
satisfies a civil standard of proof, or where intention can be inferred from
an electoral windfall that a governing party would receive as a result of
vote dilution.
These lines of argument do not provide an assured route to better
constitutional protection for equal voting power and a concomitant
defence against gerrymandering. What they do suggest, however, is that
given a sympathetic climate of judicial opinion, the legal materials exist
for success in this regard.
